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First
published in: CONTRASTS
AND SOLUTIONS IN THE CAUCASUS. Ole Højris and Sefa Martin Yürükel (eds.). Pp. 140-158.
Copyright: Aarhus University Press and the author.
Aarhus 1999.
By Søren Theisen
Since political culture inevitably will reflect
culture in a broader sense, any attempt to analyse political events in a specific region
without considering the characteristics of its social culture, will be at best inadequate
and at worst grossly misleading. Thus Western observers studying Caucasia from their own
perspective of a well established public order should note two important aspects: First -
that the Caucasian region as a whole, despite 200 years of Russian hegemony shares a much
longer history of political and cultural integration with the geographically adjoining
Middle East; Second - that this part of the world is lacking the Western tradition of
nationbuilding and what we term "the rule of law".
Generally speaking, the European type of
state implies the notion of public participation, a formalized distribution of power and -
since the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars - civil rights and a measure of
standardization, unknown in tribal, feudal and other pre-modern societies. It moreover
means individual identification with and loyalty to large ab-stract communities, based on
rules and norms, which are accepted by citizens and authorities alike. Turning to Caucasia
on the other hand, this Western foundation for the polity essentially does not exist, the
regional populations having throughout history maintained another social organisation,
similar to that of the Middle East. Originating in Soviet policies during this century
however, a hybrid version of the modern nationstate has emerged, manifested by a Western
institutional framework super-imposed upon and partially obscuring a basically non-Western
society underneath. This picture is further complicated by the fact that representatives
of the various post-soviet Caucasian polities, like the educated elites of other
non-Western societies at this stage have learned to apply Western terms in their discourse
with the outside world no matter how little they may correspond to local political
realities. But precisely because this terminology is so familiar and self-evident to us,
it may cloud the vision when viewing the current conflicts and power struggles in the
region.
Having a clear concept of what different
political insti-tutions constitute in a Western environment, one may only too easily take
them at face value elsewhere. But the formal pheno-mena - constitutions, governmental
statements, parliamentary elections and political parties - in a non-Western culture can
only on a very limited scale serve as a key for understanding events. Instead a political
analysis of non-Western societies specifically has to investigate both the sphere of state
power and the basic values of people, motivating them to act - or in other words: their
culture. Thus the continous importance of culture in Caucasia cannot be stressed often
enough as a vital key to understand how politics function in day to day practice.
Unfortunately this essentially contested
concept has un-til recently been somewhat downplayed in political science, as it is often
diffuse and hard both to get a methodological grip on, as well as to provide sufficient
quantitative evidence to support a thesis. In my own experience culture must be
"lived" again and again in different settings and in that sense an in-formal
evening with Caucasian friends (regardless of national or confessional affiliation),
watching the social interaction, can be more revealing than days of formal research.
A previous chapter has discussed the
socio-historical foundation of political culture in Caucasia until the late Soviet period.
The following presents a broad outline of regional developments since then, meant as a
framework for subsequently discussing certain aspects of this political culture in current
practice.
"Glasnost" and "perestrojka" in
Soviet Caucasia
Rapid, but uneven industrialization and thorough
politicising of etno-cultural issues on a background of totalitarian regimentation had
undermined traditional Caucasian society during more than two generations by the time
Mikhail Gorbachov initiated his reformprogramme of glasnost ("openness") and perestrojka
("reconstruction") in 1986. Given the lack of democratic institutions and civic
involvement in the affairs of government, overheated nationalism rather than cooperation
and reform became a public rallying point, notably by deprived ethnic minorities in the
Soviet republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia as well as parts of the North
Caucasus. Soon demands for revision of their hitherto established status turned into the
focus of political events, and the leaders of the various "titular
nationalities" predictably responded with accusations of destructive irridentism and
extremism.
In february 1988, Armenians in the
Autonomous Oblast of Nagorno Karabakh took the unprecedented step of applying for transfer
of their territory to Soviet Armenia, citing economical and cultural neglect by the
republic of Azerbaijan as causes for seceding. In Armenia this demand sparked massive
popular support, and Karabakh became the uniting symbol for a range of local grievances.
The Azerbaijani leadership rejected all claims however, and everyone appealed to Moscow.
But as the center stalled, only later to reject border changes, initial clashes soon
escalated into a full-blown inter-ethnic conflict. By late 1989 this fight was threatening
to turn into an inter-republican war.
Similar developments occurred in Georgia,
where Abkhazians protested against being a minority of only 18 % in their Autonomous
Republic as a result of ethnic Georgian immigration, and Ossetians demanded their
Autonomous Region of South Ossetia joined with North Ossetia in the Russian Federation. A
counter-demonstration held in Tbilisi in april 1989, defending Georgias territorial
integrity and independence was blodily crushed by Soviet special forces, thus destroying
the last bits of Communist party and government credibiliity in the republic.
The inter-ethnic violence in Transcaucasia
was from the beginning accompagnied by the breakdown of centralised authority in the
republics as elements within the formal system com-peted for power with a range of
informal groups, each side playing the nationalist card. In the prevailing athmosphere of
uncertainty and insecurity attempts from Moscow to defuse the situation by purging
republican heads of government, introducing administrative supervision by the center were
of no avail, and by 1990-91 real power in Transcaucasia had shifted from the Communist
leaders to opposition-forces, declaring the independence of their respective republics.
In Armenia the spontaneous
Karabakh-committee already in 1989 evolved into the Armenian Pan-national Movement, and in
August 1990 one of its leaders - Levon Ter-Petrossian - became chairman of the republic's
Supreme Soviet. In Azerbaijan this process was more protracted, the social structure being
less cohesive and the Communist authorities in Baku initially better able to resist the
diffuse Azerbaijani Popular Front, which instead turned more extreme under the leadership
of Abulfaz Elchibey. Subsequently the central government in Moscow inter-vened on a
background of mounting public disorder, leading to the bloody occupation of Baku by
special forces in January 1990 and temporary suppression of the Popular Front.
In Georgia a plethora of smaller
nationalist groups gra-dually merged into two major coalitions: the radical National Forum
and the (initially more moderate) "Round Table - Free Georgia" led by Zviad
Gamsakhurdia. Following parliamentary elections in oktober 1990 the latter became chairman
of the Supreme Soviet in Tbilisi, and likewise when Georgia had declared independence in
april 1991 her first elected president.
In the North Caucasus, administratively
organised in seven autonomies according to major ethnic divisions, the closing years of
the Soviet regime witnessed a certain resurgence of nationalism among non-Russians and
Russians alike. Here however, this implied less extreme demands, the region being part of
the Russian Federation. Each autonomy had - and has still - both considerable communities
of ethnic russians and numerous minorities other than the "titular" nationality.
Instead of claiming secession and independence a broad gathering of indigenous
representatives established an "Assembly of Caucasian Mountaineers" in 1989 with
the aim of having the autonomies recognised as full union republics.
Independence and anarchy
Following the aborted Moscow-coup in august 1991 and
the forma-lisation of independence in Azerbaijan and Armenia, two visible trends emerged
in South Caucasia: First a dramatic escalation of various inter-ethnic conflicts took
place as the new governments in the three republics attempted to assert control over their
respective national territories by military means. Not meeting with spectacular successes
in their efforts however, these wars have simmered as typical "low intensity
conflicts" since 1994; Secondly and partially connected, a general instability
appeared within the newly independent states, as their ruling coalitions split into a
range of particularist factions, often heavily armed and rivalling for power. Both trends
were facilitated on the one hand by huge amounts of former Soviet military equipment
falling to friends and foes alike, and on the other hand from efforts by Russia to regain
her influence in the region.
When Azerbaijan declared independence in
late August 1991, the rebellious Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh lost no time pronouncing
their enclave a separate republic on the 3rd of september, although until now not
internationally recognised. Initially hard pressed in the fightings the Karabakh Armenians
had reversed the situation by the spring of 1992, at first opening a corridor via Lachin
to Armenia proper and then during the next year and a half gradually seizing large chunks
of Azerbaijani territory outside Karabakh (apr. one fourth of the republic of Azerbaijan).
Military defeats at the front repercussioned politically behind it and paved the way for
the ousting of president Ayaz Mutalibov and election of a Popular Front government in
Baku. Orientating Azerbaijan more visibly towards Turkey, but failing to improve matters
at home however, it was itself toppled after only a year by current president Haidar
Aliyev, (party- and KGB-chief of Soviet Azerbaijan 1974-86) in a grand display of
traditional clan-politics.[i] Having
come to power Aliyev hurried to remedy the strained relations with Russia and Iran,
applying for full Azerbaijani membership of the CIS. Domestically he has systematically
been silencing opposition to his government and as of 1996 survived two coup attempts. The
dominant political party is his own - the "Yeni Azerbaijan" or "New Azerbaijan".
In april 1994 a ceasefire was established
in Karabakh and direct bilateral negotiations initiated, although without much success,
the Armenians insisting on their right to selfdetermination and the Baku authorities
upholding the inviolability of existing borders.
Events in Georgia during the immidiate
post-independence period were even more volatile, stressing the historical
regio-nalisation of this republic. The Mingrelian Zviad Gamsakhurdia deliberately incited
Georgian chauvinism against Abkhazians and Ossetians and at the same time turned
increasingly authoritarian vis-à-vis the opposition in Tblisi. Mounting dissatisfaction
culminated with his violent overthrow in january 1992 by a fragile coalition, led by
former allies Tengiz Sigua, Tengiz Kito-vani and Jzhaba Ioseliani (the latter a convicted
bankrobber). Gamsakhurdia himself took refuge with the Chechen leader Jokhar Dudaiev in
Grozny, while his adherents launched an insurrection in Mingrelia, placing all of western
Georgia outside government control. Faced by civil war, clashes in Ossetia and increasing
tension in Abkhazia, the ruling military council invited Eduard Shevardnadze - foreign
minister under Gorbachov and party chief of Soviet Georgia from 1972-85 - to reenter
Georgian politics in march 1992.
Despite strong protests from opposition
factions Shevarnadze has since then concentrated a large measure of power in his own
hands, but most Georgians appear to view him as the only alternative to total chaos. His
decision to have Georgia join the CIS in the autumn of 1993 came too late however, to
prevent Tbilisi suffering a crushing defeat to the Abkhazian rebels, supported militarily
by volunteers from the North Caucasus and at least indirectly by Russia.
By comparison Armenia has been the most
stable of the Transcaucasian Republics since independence, with President Ter-Petrossian
being the only initial post-soviet national leader lasting in office more than a year.
Reasons for this may be attributed to a combination of the relative ethnic homogeneity in
Armenia, a different tradition of identitybuilding due to a history of shared sufferings -
in particular the genocide, organised by the Ottoman authorities i 1915 - and a
consciousness of territorial vulnerability. The latter aspect nessecitating pragmatism,
has been reflected by the Armenian entrance into the CIS already in 1991, and continuous
attempts to normalise relations with Turkey. Even so, Armenian pragmatism has not averted
substantial hardships, caused by the war in Karabakh and the disruption of former economic
ties, leading to widespread disillu-sion with Ter-Petrossian and his ruling party.
At the same time the government has not
shown hesitation in dealing with the opposition, giving rise to accusations of abuse and
corruption. A principal antagonist developed with the "Dashnaktsutioun", the
historical nationalist party of Armenia, in itself a militant and highly centralised
organisation, which reestablished a local chapter in 1991 after 70 years of politicising
in the Armenian diaspora. Being mainly a diaspora party and thus reflecting diaspora
concerns, the Dashnaks from the start contested Ter Petrossian's pragmatism towards Turkey
and Russia as well as his domestic politics. Remaining on the other hand under domination
of a shadowy leadership outside Armenia the party gave cause for accusations of plotting
subversion, culminating with it being systematically persecuted since late 1994.
But as this step came on a background of mounting
public distrust in the government it only contributed to its further discrediting,
although Ter-Petrossian secured himself reelection in both 1995 and 1996. Events finally
culminated in late january 1998, when Ter-Petrossian came under heavy criticism from his
Primeminister Robert Kocharian (formerly President of Nagorno Karabakh), ostensibly due to
his accept of the OSCE-sponsored peaceplan for the enclave. He chose to step down and
Kocharian was eventually elected new President of Armenia in march.
Concerning the war in Karabakh, Armenia has
insisted on the right of local Armenians to self-determination - not independence - and
extended economic as well as military support to the rebels. On the other hand it should
be noted that the Yerevan- government also consistently has withheld recognition of the
selfdeclared Karabakh-republic, and accordingly denied its involvement in the conflict.
The Chechen war of secession.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 prompted the
first openly declared secession among the autonomies of the North Caucasus: that of the
Chechens, led by Jokhar Dudaiev, a former Soviet airforce-general, who was elected
president in October 1991. Transforming the self-declared republic - Ichkeria - the
Chechen half of the former "Chechen-Ingush" autonomous republic into a Caucasian
Andorra, Dudaiev maintained a bold policy of confronting Russia, responding in kind by
attempts to foment insurrection against his high-handed rule among rivals within the
Chechen clan structure.[ii] But
as these attempts proved inadequate president Boris Yeltsin chose instead to embark on a
fullscale military reconquest of Chechnya in December 1994, causing massive carnage and
destruction. Predictably the Che-chens united against their common enemy - at least
temporarily.
Although the Russians succeeded in killing
Dudaiev, the Moscow authorities finally had to accept a ceasefire, based on withdrawal of
troops and negotiations on the future status of Chechnia. The latter issue still being in
abeyance, the Chechens nonetheless held a national election in january 1997, choosing the pragmatist Aslan Maskhadov as their
new leader.
Unfortunately however, he has not yet been able to
impose a viable postwar order, divisions along clan allegiances running as strong as ever,
accompagnied by acts of banditry and kidnappings (including of foreign aid personal) like
in prewar days. Similarly the war also
demon-strated the lack of cohesion in North Caucasia as a whole. None of the other
populations wanted to repeat Dudaiev's adventurous secession, preferring to remain within
the Russian Federation - a concern motivated by economic considerations. Even the closely
related Ingush chose separation from the Chechens in 1991, hoping to gain Russian support
for their territorial claim on the Prigorodny district in North Ossetia. For similar
reasons the establishment of a North Caucasian Federation in the same year has remained
mostly formal, the actual differences of interests and concerns among its 14 members being
as real as their stated desire for cooperation.
Summing up, the demise of Soviet power in
Caucasia has so far resulted in the establishment of three independent, internationally
recognised, nationstates - Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia - the latter two however,
truncated by specific ethnic minorities carving out separate polities of their own.
Furthermore any number of similar entities potentially exist both here and in the North
Caucasus.
During the last six years the whole region
has experienced widespread violence, the displacement of large populations, general social
disintegration and economic ruin. Simultaneously events have facilitated and in turn been
fueled by the rebirth of authoritorian governments in the new independent republics,
despite their claims to democracy. On the positive side it may be noted though, that these
structures at the moment are headed by reasonably pragmatic leaders, a fact which has been
duly re-cognised by the international community, having blessed them in office after a
spate of UN/OSCE-monitored elections in 1995-96.
Internally however, they are characterised by inherent
fragili-ties, threatening future instability. The current situation in the different
Caucasian polities, whether independent or auto-nomous presents a shared problem in this
regard, which in the following will justify treating the region as a whole.
Post-soviet Caucasia - the burden of culture.
In the opinion of this author most of the current
problems in Caucasia, regardless of country or polity, originate from the hybrid political
culture of the region, combining two fundamentally different components: On the one hand
the European notion of the nation-state, which has been acquired in the process of
Sovietisation; On the other hand the regionally prevailing pre-modern practice and
mentality of primary group identification, with its mainfocus on the extended family and
similarly close personal networks. This dichotomy, which may be described as partial modernity,
hinders the development of new democratic structures and blocks solutions to the urgent
problems on every level of society. Thus, to paraphrase a Stalinist slogan - what we see in Caucasia
to day is a political system, that is modern in form but premodern in content.
To understand the scope of the problem it
is necessary to compare the notions of society and state in Europe and Caucasia
respectively. Politics in the Western tradition essentially im-plies formalized
distribution of power and the ability to unite heterogenous groups into the nation-state.
Such an integration may only be achieved, when the state acquires general acceptance of
certain rules, applicable to all of society and forming the basis for public institutions.
Or in short: limiting indi-vidual latitude by the "rule of law". This concept of
order evolved gradually from the fusion of classical Greek and Roman thinking and has over
the last two centuries become the basic model of social organisation in Europe and North
America, exam-plified by the largely transparent Western legal state and its monopoly on
legitimate violence.
In Caucasia however, politics have remained
qualitatively different from the West, stressing the fact that the region and its peoples,
whether Christian or Islamic, since ancient times have been closely connected to the
Middle East - not to Russia, and certainly not to Western Europe. Thus despite having
perio-dically been subject to influences from the Mediteranean World, Roman law and
concepts of a public sphere never penetrated the region. Instead the most salient feature
of Middle-eastern (and Caucasian) society throughout history is its recurring
fragmentation in primary groups based on kinship or similar intimate personal ties.
Although in perpetual external competition over available resurces, internal primary group
cohesion is carefully maintained by the loyalty of individual members to specific group
norms, in particular the fullfilling of obligations, and enforced by notions of personal
honour or shame. This implies in other words that an individuals notions of identity,
responsibility and personal worth continuously are centered on a tangible community of
maybe a few thousand - ie. the opposite of an anonymous nation. Only external pressures
may effect broader solidarity between many such primary groups, but usually fluctuating
and temporary. The stress on primary group loyalty has a decisive influence on all aspects of life in
societies of the Middle-eastern type and usually take precedence over other
considerations, including politics and religion. But precisely for this very reason, it
precludes the formation of more permanent loyalty to larger abstract communities, such as
the nationstate and its institutions. The two kinds of affiliation simply don't mix, and
having to choose between abiding by the formal laws of a state or loyalty to a relative,
friend or patron, the average Middle-eastener, regardless of faith or nationality will
feel heavily obliged to accomodate the latter rather than suffer the shame for not doing
so. Reflecting patronage as a general dynamic, the arabic term "entesaab" -
"connection" becomes no less than a keyword to all social organisation in the
entire region, including Caucasia. Under these conditions however, "politics" or
the distribution of power in practical terms no longer has to do with the
"polis" - the general consideration about society - but with promoting the
specific interests of a particular clan, clique or other personal network (especially its
access to material benefits).
Since politics are ultimately determining
the character of a given state, a political culture of this kind is simply not able to
produce a legal state in the conventional Western sense. Instead we see the typical
Middle-eastern "patrimonial" state, where the state apparatus is functioning,
not according to some generally accepted "rule of law", but as the private
property of a specific network or a coalition of networks, united behind a powerfull
leader. A state of this kind can by its very nature have neither transparency in state
matters nor a monopoly on legitimate violence. On the contrary, government being an issue
decided upon and legitimised by kin and friendship connections of locally dominant primary
groups is kept hid-from the general public. This usually also nessecitates state-power to
be maintained by more or less visible coercion, as it is fair game for rivalling primary
groups, possessing the adequate force to seize it. In the absence of an unrestricted
public sphere, opposition politics subsequently are conspirative, with changes of power
taking place as coups. Such an event how-ever, will usually only signal the change of one
primary group and its clients with another, structured in a similar fashion, which tend to
make political parties of secondary importance.
Even a cursory glance will show these
aspects as recurring pattern throughout the history of Caucasia, witnessed by the fact
that none of the current regional populations at any time have created strong states,
built on abstract authority. During the Soviet period neither terror nor transfer of
entire populations was able to sway Caucasian loyalty to the intimate community. Rather it
was facilitated by the actual functioning of Soviet society, which demanded good informal
connections to overcome, as well as by the need of the central authorities to coopt local
influentials in the official nationsstate-building of the non-russian union republics.
Although existing patriarchal and religious elites were largely eliminated in favour of
native Communist cadres, these were not immune to traditional patterns of authority and
loyalty, which encouraged the continuation of pre-modern practices in modern guises of
Party and state. With time informal networks of patronage and favoritism, often
family-based, arose parallel to the formal political and legal
structures at all levels, proving impossible to reform.[iii] Thus central efforts to combat corruption
and nepotism through direct appointments, as in Transcaucasia in the early 1970's, only
led to new leaders substituting client networks as demon-strated by J. P. Willerton in the
case of Haidar Aliyev during his posting as party boss in Azerbaijan.[iv]
Although similar research is not available with regards to Armenia and Georgia, we have
hardly reason to assume it to be any different considering the prevailing common culture.[v]
This might moreover explain the relative ease however, with which both Haidar Aliyev and
Eduard Shevardnadze resumed power in post-independent Azerbaijan and Georgia, being able
to draw on formerly established extensive networks of personal adherents.[vi] By
comparison their immidiate predecessors, ie. the Azerbaijani Popular Front and Zviad
Gamsakhurdia et al. despite urban popularity as dissisidents, were neither well equipped
nor adept in striking viable deals with provincial powerholders, the former originating
among the Baku intelligentsia and the latter possessing his essential personal powerbase
in Mingrelia. In Armenia on the other hand, the apparent political staying power of
president Ter-Petrossian and his government, indicates an ability to link the interests of
locally dominant elites to the Armenian Pan-national Movement, which strongly resembles
traditional ways to legitimize ruler-ship in that part of the region.
Given the existing political culture, the
new formal par-liamentary institutions of Caucasia - although of recurring in-terest to
international observers and agencies - may primarily be considered disguises for more
informal structures of power, or what locals refer to as "mafiyas". In the words
of anthropologist Nora Dudwick with regards to Armenia, but appliable to any part of
Caucasia, these structures appear as "clusters of relationships based on networks of
relatives, friends, colleagues, acquaintances and neighbours, hierarchically bound
to-gether through the on-going exchange of favours and obligations".[vii] As
powerful individuals domiate this exchange, such networks typically form around executive
government officials - presidents, the heads of important ministries (e.g. of Defence or
the Interior) and directors of big enterprises - and thus able to influence
decision-making, they function in practice as the social and political backbone of the
state.[viii]
Considering it their prerogative to drain available public resources, the individuals
involved in the dominant patron-client groups are not averse to use coercion against
competitors for power and economic benefits, and subsequently become a major hindrance to
the stability of the new polities, not to mention their democratisation. This gives no
reason to assume however, that the local political oppositions would be acting any
different if they had been in power.
Material resources clearly are prime
objects of rivalry, and despite the appaling economic conditions, well positioned
individuals able to take advantage of privatisation and a fluid legal framework may amass
fortunes by dealing in state-property or establishing monopolies within industry and
commerce. Add to that, proceedings from arbitrary taxation, misappropriation of foreign
aid and bribetaking for services and favours, including exemption from punishment. Such
activities are greatly benefitted by the fact that ruling networks no longer risk
interference from any higher external authority as well as a traditional acceptance of
nepotism. Not surprisingly, the general situation has facilitated the rise of powerfull
mafia-like groups in the economic sector, accompanied by the smuggling of scarce consumer
goods, narcotics and military hardware across all borders and frontlines, shootouts
between armed gangs etc. As a result of corrupt
practices in politics and economy contrasted by the real destitution among the populations
of the region, an abyss has opened the state structures and society in post-independent
Caucasia, many citizens viewing political actors with cynicism and and dismissing
parliamentary institutions as merely covers for power-struggles.[ix]
Thus civil society, historically weak and
fragmented, has remained so. Apart from the formal governmental parties, joined in the
hope of influence, most other parties are small in terms of members and voterappeal, being
limited to the major cities and lacking acces to resources. In addition they rarely
display substantial programmatic variations, all supporting independence, privatisation,
market economy as well as the local national cause. Notable exceptions are a few parties
with an established historical or oppositional profile, including the resurrected
Communists, although in the latters case more due to nostalgic longings for a by-gone
social stability than ideology. Common to all political parties however, is their
appearance as informal groups of personal adherents, formed around some charismatic or
otherwise known individual, and thus functioning as in-struments of elite competition
rather than genuine public organisations.
Similarly to the political structures of
state and socie-ty being used by competing elite networks within the individual polity, so
the symbolic language of ethnicity and nation may be seen. Accordingly, the armed
conflicts which have subsequently been framed in the language of ethnic concerns, would
appear to be more about rivalry over resources and power than about iden-tity and
primordial hatreds between certain national and ethnic units. In this instrumentalist view
of ethnicity, elite rivalry is the fundamental dynamic, and ethnic conflict rises not from
objective cultural values and differences, such as myths, language, customs, origin etc,
but from ethnic elites selecting or constructing specific cultural symbols, which they
then use as instruments in their competition for power, resources and control of
territory. Although this might represent a dark view of ethnic leaders as pragmatic power
seekers and symbolic manipulators, it does hold the hope that neither national nor ethnic
conflicts are in any way natural, but only reflect fluctuating political conditions at a
given time.
International tensions
Caucasia is positioned as a buffer-zone between
Eastern Europe and Southwestern Asia and thus on the geopolitical faultlines between three
major blocs of security interests. Historically this has found expression in the rivalry
between empires based in Anatolia, on the Iranian plateau and the Russian plains
respectively. While the nature of relations between these powers always has had
consequences for Caucasia, internal rivalries in Caucasia equally has tended to involve
the local elites on different sides abroad. Today both aspects of this general pattern may
be witnessed in the current concerns of Turkey, Russia and Iran vis-à-vis the various
political conflicts in Caucasia.
The Zar, the Sultan and the Shah are all
gone, and nei-ther Russians, Turks nor Persians demand changes of the international
borders. Subsequently no obvious risk of clashes can be said to exist between these three
neighbours of Caucasia. But the Caucasian disorder has ramifications to the instability of
the Russian Federation, as well as to the national cohesion and disastrous economies of
Iran and Turkey. The danger is the weakness of formal security structures in the region.
Only the Ankara government has taken steps towards creating multilateral systems, and
although Turkey, Russia and the three South Cauca-sian states have joined the OSCE,
contacts between the countries involved in regional problems remain mostly bilateral.
Concerning Turkey, the conflict over the
Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been decidedly awkward. Independent Azerbaijan
has met widespread sympathy among the turkish public and Baku's confrontation with the
secessionist armenians has rekindled old hostilities against the republic of Armenia. The
Ankara government however, has refrained from giving more than symbolic military help to
Azerbaijani war-efforts in Karabakh and allowed blocaded Armenia periodical transit for
supplies the West. At the same time Turkey, which since 1921 has been official guarantee
power for the borders of Azerbaijan has refused to accept Baku's annulment of the
autonomous status of Karabakh. In 1992 Turkey moreover invited both Azerbaijan and Armenia
to participate in the ambitious project of "The Black Sea Conference", although
neither posses a Black Sea coastline. Such constructive steps by the turkish government
has been re-ciprocated by inofficial Armenian assurance renunciating claims on former
armenian territories of Kars, Ardahan and Igdir lost in 1920, as well as by political
restraint in Karabakh.
One reason for the moderation of the Ankara
government may be seen in Turkeys poor relations with her southern neighbours Iraq and
Syria, particularly the latter, which supports the Workers Party of Kurdistan (PKK).
Naturally Ankara wants to avoid a similar alliance between the government in Armenia and
the Kurdish extremists, a perspective which otherwise could not be ruled out.
A similar motive has caused the Iranian
leaders to act prudently and moderately in Caucasian matters due to Tehran's apprehension
that militant Azerbaijani nationalism may encourage separatism among the 15 million
azeri-speakers in Iranian Azerbaijan. This Persian "worst-case scenario" came
close to fullfilment in 1979, when the newly established Islamic regime had to crush an
armed Azerbaijani uprising in Tabriz. Consequently officially fundamentalist Iran has
chosen not to play the religious card in their own "backyard" and instead
attempted to mediate in the Karabakh-conflict. Meanwhile extensive relations of trade have
been etablished, allowing the officially Christian Armenians to recieve both gasoline and
foodstuffs (in July 1995 this author observed a convoy of fueltrucks with Iranian license
plates in Karabakh).
While Turkey and Iran have strong reasons
for pragmatism and restraint, the dark horse in Caucasian politics is Russia, reflecting
historical strategic concerns in relation to the Middle East as well as a consequence of
fluctuating domestic events in recent
years. Thus, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the brief appearence of a power
vacuum, the leaders in Moscow have unequivocally declared Caucasia a Russian sphere of
interest as part of the socalled "near abroad" and subsequ-ently "off
limits" to foreign powers. As a result, Russia has interfered quite openly in the
various Caucasian conflicts and succeeded in reestablishing herself as dominant power in
Trans-caucasia, obtaining military base agreements, rights to joint patrolling of
international borders and membership-applications to the CIS in the process.
But this interference has failed however,
to achieve any stable structure for the renewed Russian presence - witness the miscarried
attempt to prevent the Chechen secession by military means - and in the whole of the
region there is an urgent need for a comprehensive policy, formalised by straight
multilateral agreements. Considering Russia's policy the particular problem of the army
should further be noted: For the first time since Peter the Great the military brass is
acting independently of the government, Russian generals having taken separate initiatives
contrary to the policy of president Yeltsin in both the Baltic countries, Moldova and
Caucasia. But especially following the disturbances in Moscow in October of 1993 and the
poli-tical reversal in December of the same year, Yeltsin appears to have accepted the new
role of the armed forces. Already in 1992 however, the General Staff had drafted a new
military doctrine, stressing options in case of a war with the traditional enemy -
USA/NATO. Thus the border of both Georgia and Armenia towards Turkey, member of NATO, is
still of decisive importance in the perspective of the generals, just like the final
version of the doctrine, which was presented in late 1993, is underlining the role of the
military in both domestic and foreign policy.
Economic prospects
Post-independent Caucasia beyond doubt posseses a real
economic potential in material as well in human resources, and expanding international
trade, economic growth and prosperity are declared objects of both local governments and
the adjoining powers, including Iran. But instability and lack of security has so far
prevented the necessary foreign investments and the development of both intra- and
extra-regional trade. Cross-border bartering of Turkish soap and Persian macaroni simply
isn't enough to en cure a viable future in economic terms. On the contrary massive inputs
of funds are called for to develop local agriculture and industry and improve the quality
of regional products so as to make them attractive to the world market. This capital
however, will not be forthcoming until the new ruling elites get their houses in order,
which will nessitate some domestic political compromises. If not, Caucasia will remain
economically linked to Russia as market outlet for her products, but on wholly un-equal
terms. Only Azerbaijani oil and natural gas has so far been able to command broader
international interest on its own account,
but both extraction and marketing remain restricted due to disagreements between foreign
investors and the regional powers concerning export-routes.
Conditions for stability
Despite internal diversity in terms of political
fragmentation and different ethnic and religious affiliation, Caucasia also does possess
certain assets for a future improvement. First of all Caucasians share a range of mutual
traits, that may serve as conflict-reducing factors. In both North (Russian) and South
Caucasia the one stable structure of society is loyalty to pri-mary groups. While this
network mentality decidedly has a negative side preventing the formation of democratic
polities, it may also function constructively, as it implies an ability to
resolve disputes between different primary groups,
based upon personal agreements between their leaders. Such abilities are typical for
pre-modern societies lacking independent legal institutions and although greatly weakened
by the vandalisation of indigenous culture during the Soviet period - Caucasians -
regardless of linguistic and religious differences share a long tradition in this respect.
As they basically act alike whether in terms of revenge, trade, hospitality or table
rituals, they also instinctively understand each other.
It should be stressed that the traumatic
"clash of cul-tures" and the destructive politization of religion in Iran and a
number of Arab countries has no parallel in Caucasia. Otherwise the fighting in Karabakh,
Abkhazia and Chechnya would have been proclaimed wars between Muslims and Christians. This
has been avoided not only because religion lost importance during seven decades of Soviet
rule, but because Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Abkhazians and Georgians are united by a common
Caucasian culture behind the thin screens of nationality and faith. Thus in contrast to
tendencies by outsiders to view them as sharply defined communities, let alone local
formal rethorics, ethnic groups divided by military frontlines in Karabakh or Abkhazia
still maintain numerous informal individual connections, including on elite level. Since
the same basic principle applies to competing
elite networks in the individual polities, it constitutes a real political asset, and
future accomodation of inte-rests may well have chances due to such personal relations.
Common culture should also be considered as
an important economic asset. Extended family ties have a commercial potential, and in
particular the Caucasian Armenians - for centuries connected to a global diaspora - follow
an ancient tradition of engaging in international commerce based on personal networks.
Also Azerbaijanis, Georgians and Chechens have recently developed visible talents in this
area, although the current Caucasian bordertrade is mainly organised in a criminal manner
due to the absence of functioning legal structures and conversely lack of respect for the
authorities. In this context, ironically as it is, criminal networks act as the primary
agents of inter-ethnic exchange and indirectly prepare the ground for peaceful coexistence
and economic cooperation.
The case of Adjaria - the autonomous
republic centered upon Georgia's important Black Sea port of Batumi - may be seen as an
example illustrating the traditional Caucasian ability to find practical solutions and
create security by downplaying ab-stract ethnic divisions and rejecting nationalist
slogans. The majority of Adjarians - 392.000 by 1989 - are Muslims, speaking a Georgian
dialect (many are bilingual, speaking also "Türki" a variant of Turkish). Since
independence real power in Ajaria has rested in the hands of a local clanleader, Aslan
Abashidze, a man who appears to know the value of money and recognises the excellent
position of his city for making it. A less pragmatic policy than his however, might easily
have provoked Tbilisi or the numerous non-Muslims of Batumi - Georgians, Armenians,
Russians etc. - by proclaiming formal independence of this tiny enclave or insisting on
the "national rights" of the Ajarians. Such an issue could - at least partially
- have been forced during the chaotic conditions in 1992 or 1993 at the same price paid by
the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This was avoided though, and Ajaria still
accepts Georgian sovereignty - in principle. Due to shrewd leadership its young men are
not parading Kalashnikovs and shouting heroic slogans to impress visiting Western
journalists, prefering engagement in the busy cross-border trade uniting Russia and the
rest of Caucasia with the Mediterranean world and profiting from attempts of Turkey to
establish good contacts with Georgia.
Abashidze's ability to divert an energy,
which elsewhere has been used for fighting, into commercial activity and his general
pragmatism is matched by the leaders of the Daghestani, Kabardia-Balkarian and
Karachai-Cherkess autonomies in Russian Caucasia. The desire for peace and the ability to
restrain irresponsable hotheads is no less Caucasian than the flamboyant irredentism of
the Chechens, Karabakh Armenians or South Ossetians, although the rejection of ethnic
hatred attracts less media attention. It reflects a deeply rooted value, shared all over
Caucasia, and Western observers should be recommended not to focus
exclusively on cultural and linguistical differences and remember that for many centuries
- right up to the time of Soviet power - the region not only was multi-cultural but also
open to cosmopolitan ideas, being connected to Persia, Turkey and the Mediterranean world
through commercial and religious ties. Of course, the past can not be reconstructed and
the collective memory of these conditions is certainly weak, but it may yet be
strengthened at the expence of current ethnocentric sentiments.
The constructive dimension of nationalism,
leading to a functioning order and subsequently to public participation in one polity is
obviously still missing in Caucasia. Instead a massive politization of culture, resulting
fron the Stalinist linking of ethnicity and territory has dominated post-independent
statebuilding, proving extremely destructive in terms of inter-ethnic wars and the
severing of economic and infrastructural ties. Hence the most important task of the
Caucasian leaders - including the decisionmakers in the autonomous areas of Russian
Caucasia - must be to
defuse ethno-linguistic nationalism: First of all in order to avoid additional
fragmentation among different communities, and second as a precondition for working out
functioning agreements between ruling networks and their major rivals among the opposition
as well as between neighbouring states. This may be achieved if the politicians begin
thinking in confederate or even federate terms, exploring local potentials for
cooperation. Western style democracy is of course precluded under the present conditions
due to the lack of democrats - as is the extension of the supra-national structures of the
EU or NATO. But a reasonably functioning order, gathering at least the southern half of
Caucasia in a some kind of a confederate system - a vital precondition for improvement of
the economy - could be achieved by the gradual establishment of a legal state and a degree
of formalisation of political life as an alternative to ethnic conflicts, conspiracies and
coups. Two aspects speak in favour of such a scenario: First - the general war fatique
among the public, which at this stage is more occupied with the problems of daily
survival; Second - the current leaders of the South Caucasian nation states, who stand
forth as pragmatics their democratic shortcomings not-withstanding,
In the arena of foreign politics a top priority would be
the establishment of a formalised regional security structure, based on regional and
international agreements, including the recognition of all existing borders. A positive
starting point for this may be seen in the fact, that all involved parties, with the
exception of Iran are members of the OSCE, and thus obliged to abstain from border
revisions by means of violence. Only by the cooling of nationalist fervour, by consciously
re-building multi-cultural societies and by the creation of inter-state and suprastate
structures for cooperation may Caucasia eventually achieve order, stability and
prosperity.
NOTES
[i]. The Crisis in Azerbaijan: How clans influence the politics of an emerging republic. J. A. Kechichian and T. W.
Karasik. Middle East Policy, Vol. 4, No. 1-2, p. 60. USA 1995.
[ii]. On
the Chechen clan structure see: Muslims of the Soviet Empire. A. Bennigsen and S. Enders
Wimbush. London, 1985.pp. 184-189.
[iii]. The
Revenge of the Past: Socialism and Ethnic Conflict in Transcaucasia.
R. G. Suny. New Left Review, No. 184. 1990.
[iv].
Azerbaidzhan and the Aliev network: Patronage and Politics in
the USSR. J. P. Willerton, Cambridge 1994, pp. 191-222.
[v]. The
Cultural Bases of Soviet Georgia's Second Economy. Gerald
Mars and Yochanan Altman. Soviet Studies, Vol. 25,No.4, October 1983, pp. 546-560.
[vi].
Georgia. From Chaos to Stability? J. Aves. Royal Institute of
International Affairs, London, 1996, p. 11 and 15.
[vii].
Political Structures in Post-communist Armenia: Images and Realities.
N. Dudwick. In K. Dawisha and B. Parrott (eds.):Conflict,
Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Cambridge. Forthcoming 1997.
[viii]. See
for example J. Aves or N. Dudwick.
[ix].
Personal observations as an election monitor in Armenia in
July 1995 under the aegis of the joint UN/OSCE monitoring operation.
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